DO WE NEED ARTILLERY IN SMALL WARS?

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■ The primary mission of artillery is to support the infantry. Light artillery is employed principally against personnel, accompanying weapons, tanks, and those material targets which its fire is able to destroy. Medium artillery reinforces the fire of light artillery, assists in counterbattery, and undertakes missions beyond the range of the power of light artillery. Anti-aircraft artillery primarily for defense against air attack may be used to supplement the fire of light artillery. Artillery fire produces great moral effect due to the strong detonation of its projectiles. Moral effect is always given consideration in plans for the employment of artillery, particularly in Small Wars.

The modern armament of minor powers and backward nations has greatly improved their morale, particularly in the initial stages of an operation. Light artillery has been given increased mobility by recent developments, and the availability of this type gives a distinct advantage to the force possessing it. After the initial stages, if it appears that artillery will not be required except for special limited missions, it can be used to an advantage in the defense of stabilized bases, and permanent stations and garrisons. The troops not needed with the artillery can be used to relieve troops on special guard duty, such as at headquarters, fixed bases, and on lines of communication.

Unless information is available that hostile forces have heavy fortifications, or are armed with a type of artillery requiring other than light artillery for counterbattery work, the necessity for medium artillery is not apparent except possibly in the initial stages. Even in the initial stages it is difficult to visualize a situation, or a theater of operations, that would require the use of medium artillery.

Considering the present type of machine guns and equipment, including the .50 caliber machine guns, and the fact that our forces would undoubtedly have sufficient control of the air to prevent an air attack in force, it would at first appear that a heavier type of anti-aircraft weapon than the machine gun would not be required. However, with the improvement in types of planes and their use at present by even backward nations, it must be remembered that their tactics would be simplified if they knew we were armed with nothing heavier than .50 caliber machine guns. We must be prepared to protect our depots and aviation fields.

Artillery to operate in the field in Small Wars must be able to go where infantry can go. It also must be of a type that can approach the speed of foot troops so that it will not materially reduce their mobility. For this reason the type of weapon employed should be pack or mountain artillery. Calwell's statement in Small Wars, Their Principles and Tactics (3d Ed. 1906), quoted below, is more applicable today than then.

"An army which, owing to national conditions, is liable to be called upon at almost any moment to take part in irregular warfare, and which does not comprise in its normal peace organization a proportion of mountain batteries ready at a short notice for the field, lacks an important item in that aggregate of services which constitutes a force genuinely adapted for conducting a campaign against savages, hill-men, or guerillas operating in broken ground."

Some artillery should accompany every expedition for possible use against towns and fortified positions, also for defense of towns, bases and other permanent establishments. It has not been used by patrols in jungle warfare, but it might be useful against occupied positions as at Guayacanes in Santo Domingo, in 1916, and El Chipote, in Nicaragua, in 1928. The enemy is likely to have artillery and almost sure to have machine guns. Clean them up with artillery. Why waste infantry on them.

"In the defense of isolated posts guns are of course invaluable. General Slobelef, in forming the advanced depots on the line, his troops were to follow toward Denghil Tepe, told off several guns to each, the infantry garrisons being very small. In such fortified positions artillery can very largely take the place of infantry, and, as only the guns themselves, with their detachments and ammunition are required, permanent arrangements for their transport can often be dispensed with." (Calwell 437.)

The strength and composition of mobile columns as employed in Small Wars will depend upon the probable resistance to be encountered, the terrain to be traversed, and the type and condition of existing transportation, and means of communication. Normally, besides infantry with its special weapons, the addition of mounted detachments, armored cars and aircraft is desirable, and if an extensive distance through undeveloped country is covered an engineer unit should be attached. Light field guns may be dispensed with in many cases if the infantry is provided with 37 mm guns and light mortars. No weapons which would tend to decrease mobility and which are not absolutely needed should be included.

The use of light field pieces has been limited in the past but with the increase of armament by all classes of powers and the improvement of defensive means they cannot be discarded unless there is every assurance that they will not be needed.

The following comments on the Waziristan Campaign, 1919, 1920, 1923, indicate the probable employment of light field guns and the type required:

"In 1923 the artillery assigned, while not greater than in former mountain expeditions, differed in the important respect that it included mountain howitzers. These were modern pieces of 3.7 inch caliber, using a high explosive shell weighing 20 pounds with a range of 5,900 yards. Field guns were of 2.75 inch caliber, using shrapnel and high explosive shell weighing 12½ pounds, and had a range of 8,000 yards. The gun was provided with full and half charges enabling it to use curve fire. The howitzer was very successful for the following reasons:

(1) The extra power conferred by the heavy projectile made it possible to clear thick scrub impervious to shrapnel, or other cover too resistant to be penetrated by small H.E. shell.

(2) It possessed an all-round field of fire and due to its curved trajectory, it could come into action from any position in the line of march.

(3) It enabled dead ground and deep ravines to be searched that could not be reached by the gun.

"The value of the effects obtained with the howitzer may be gauged by the name given it by the tribesmen, 'the gun with the eyes,' since they could not understand how ground invisible to any hostile observer could be searched by the somewhat deadly and very noisy shell of the howitzer. In the last capaign a section of six-inch howitzers was employed. With its 100-pound shell and 9,000 yard range, it evoked the uttermost consternation among the natives.

"The value of artillery in mountain warfare was found to be as great as ever. The killing effect of the howitzer was great, and increased the tribesmen's respect for artillery. The howitzer is, at present, the nearest approach to the ideal mountain weapon.

"During the campaign artillery was used on special tasks as follows:

(1) For the protection of camps to keep down sniping and to support outlying piquets.

(2) For the destruction of villages and frontier towers.

(3) For the defense of fixed posts.

"The relative value of both artillery and machine guns was infinitely greater on the frontier than in Europe."

BOOK REVIEWS

"IMPERIAL POLICING"

MAJOR GENERAL SIR CHARLES GWYNN, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.

Reviewed by First Lieutenant A. R. Pefley, USMC.

The Author:—Fortified with an enviable experience and a wide knowledge of colonial policing, Major General Sir Charles Gwynn, British Army, retired, adds an important work to his writings in his recent book "Imperial Policing." He is a distinguished tactician, was head of the British commission for delimitation of the Sudan-Abyssinia frontier, and from 1926-31 Commandant of the British Staff College. From 1923-24 he served as A.D.C. to the King.

While a major war demands that an army develop and apply a maximum of force, in a peace time policing operation the mission must be accomplished with a minimum. Hence, "Small Wars" require patience, cool judgment, initiative, and intelligence in junior commanders as in no other situation.

General Gwynn indicates clearly the doctrines on which a policing operation should be based. He champions a "Continuity of policy carried out with a firm hand," and deplores vacillating tactics fluxuating from an unintelligent brutality to repressive compromises. The junior commander must be endowed with unusual powers and in the absence of same have the assurance of support in taking *Reasonable* measures. Too frequently the soldier is sacrificed on the political altar, as a result of which initiative, so necessary a quality, is curbed. A keen, sympathetic, understanding, is essential between the civil authorities, the high military commander, and the junior military commander. Minor successes for the enemy are very detrimental and to insure against them, mobility, surprise, co-ordinated action, energy, and relentless pressure are necessary.

After dwelling at length on the above principles and doctrines, General Gwynn analyses several policing operations in which the British Army has been engaged since Armitsar City in 1919. Egypt, Shanghai, Palestine, Peshawar, Burma and other uprisings are included. Each event is an interesting story of a policing operation. In each case causes, actions, mistakes, and results are discussed.

In this collection of "Imperial Policings" there gleams a wisdom and intelligent difficult to surpass. Officers of the British Army are now required to make a systematic study of the principles on which the Army functions in outlying stations when civil authority fails. "Imperial Policing" is not only a fine text for all Marine Officers, but in addition a series of fascinating military stories.

A SEARCHLIGHT ON THE NAVY

HECTOR BYWATER

Reviewed by First Lieutenant A. R. Pefley, USMC.

The author, Hector Bywater, long famous naval analyst, needs little introduction. As a writer on world naval affairs, he is unparalleled. His predictions, as set forth in such previous works as "Navies and Nations" and "Sea Power in the Pacific" have been uncannily accurate. In his recent book, "A Searchlight on the Navy," after depicting the present international naval situation, Mr. Bywater prophecies chaos for future limitations conferences. This surmise is vindicated by current events.

"A Searchlight on the Navy," as the title indicates, is a keen analysis of Britain's present sea-power. While not belittling new developments, in the art of war, such as aviation, Mr. Bywater indicates clearly the necessity, more than ever before, of a strong navy for the preservation of the Empire. He deplores the mistakes His Majesty's Government has made in disarmament conferences, and the resulting undominating position on the sea and in the air Britain occupies. One chapter is entitled "The British Navy in Eclipse." Another, "Britain's Clipped Wings." Still another, "Britain's Blunder at Washington."

Various elements of Naval war such as fuel, big ships or small, destroyers, submarines, battleships, and officers, are discussed. Most of the book is devoted to England's present naval situation, but in the later chapters, Mr. Bywater turns to his favorite territory and in his sharp, piercing style gives us the present outlook in the Pacific. To students of the international naval situation of today, this book brings not only a fine text but very interesting reading.

CHANGE IN UNIFORM

The Major General Commandant has consented to change the style of both the white mess jacket and the blue mess jacket to a "V" necked cut resembling the style used by the Army.

The blue and white service blouse remains the same style.

He has also approved the recommendation of the Uniform Board which makes the metal rank insignia all smooth and a trifle smaller than the present regulation.